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EXCLUSION OF INCOMPETENT EVIDENCE FROM
FEDERAL GRAND JURY PROCEEDINGS
THE trial determination of conviction or acquittal follows other stages of the
criminal process at which tentative judgments are made about the guilt or in-
nocence of the defendant. These stages-arrest, preliminary hearing, indict-
ment-may be viewed as a series of pre-trial screens designed to pass persons
apparently guilty of a crime along the path toward ultimate adjudication while
eliminating from the process those who seem innocent.' From the moment the
initial decision to arrest or indict is made until the termination of the case, the
subject remains at all times liable to sanctions: deprivations of life, liberty,
dignity, and property resulting from state acts purposely directed against him.
The commonly accepted reasons in the criminal law for applying sanctions-
retribution, restraint, rehabilitation, and general deterrence-all presuppose
guilt.2 Because of the presumption of innocence,3 "guilt" within the criminal
process can be defined only in terms of conviction and thus can be applied
only after the fact of conviction; "innocence," on the other hand, unless an
individual has been acquitted, represents a state that may at any time turn into
guilt.4 Thus, when sanctions are inflicted at preconviction stages they are
necessarily borne by innocent people. The justification for the infliction of
sanctions against persons presumptively innocent is the need for an efficacious
and fair procedure leading to conviction. But the presumption of innocence
requires that the imposition of preconviction sanctions be kept at a minimum
consistent with allowing the process to run its course.
5
If preconviction sanctions 1 are to be kept within a process leading to con-
viction, the evidence considered at pretrial stages should, to the extent feasible,
1. See generally ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL 3-193 (1947)
A. Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal Procedure, 69
YALE L.J. 1149, 1163-72 (1960).
2. In the case of an innocent man, a condition essential to each justification of sanctions
is left unsatisfied: retribution presumes a motivating wrong; rehabilitation assumes a mani.
fested criminal defect; general deterrence presupposes a causal relationship between mis-
conduct and sanction; and, within a society that values individual freedom, individual
restraint must be preceded by conduct suggestive of future undesirable acts which underlie
restraints placed on an individual. See generally, DONNELLY, GOLDSTEIN & SCHWARTZ,
CRIMINAL LAw 498-518 (1962).
3. For a discussion of the operative effect of the presumption of innocence within the
broad context of the criminal process, see A. Goldstein, The Slate and the Accused: Balance
of Advantage in Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149 (1960).
4. Acquittal at trial because of the prohibition against double jeopardy is a prospectively
conclusive statement of a person's innocence in relation to certain events. Prospectiveness
can also be injected into "innocence" by the running of the statute of limitations or the grant
of statutory immunity, both forms of "acquittal" without trial.
5. J. Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process: Low Visibililty
Decisions in the Administration of Justice, 69 YALE L.J. 543, 549-50 (1960).
6. Indictments, for example, act as sanctions by depriving those accused of self-respect
and by setting or keeping in motion a process that may produce a deprivation of liberty,
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be limited to that evidence which would be admissible at trial. At present,
there are no general provisions in federal lawv for implementing at the grand
jury hearing those qualitative evidentiary standards applicable at trial. This
permits decisions requiring an individual to stand trial to be based upon vari-
ous forms of incompetent evidence. The effective exclusion of incompetent
evidence from the grand jury, however, would require engrafting judicial safe-
guards upon proceedings which have traditionally been subject to a minimum
of external checks. Although not approving the use of incompetent evidence,
commentators have justified nonintervention in all pretrial proceedings on the
grounds that rigorous adherence to the panoply of safeguards at trial will
afford sufficient protection to the accused and that judicial control and safe-
guards at pretrial stages would hamper other necessary functions of the pro-
cess.7 For instance, it is believed that "judicializing" the grand jury proceed-
ings would impair the usefulness of the grand jury as an investigating agency.
Such a view not only assumes too generally that safeguards at particular stages
in the pretrial process will impair other functions but also overlooks the fact
that the sanctions resulting from mere involvement in the process may be
severe. Because variations between evidentiary standards used at trial and at
grand jury proceedings may distort the relationship between indictment and
the likelihood of conviction at trial, an examination of the feasibility of impos-
ing trial-type evidentiary standards on federal grand juries seems warranted.8
through detention and restriction, and of property, through lost earnings, defense expenses,
and bail. In addition, regard for grand jury findings has an impact on society that may
result in a further deprivation of the accused's dignity by alienating the respect of the com-
munity. In order to minimize pretrial sanctions both efficiently and effectively, many sub-
stantial changes in the structure of the pretrial process would be required. Full implementa-
tion of such policy might be deemed to necessitate the abrogation of the secrecy and ex parte
character of the grand jury proceeding or the development of a full adversary procedure at
the preliminary hearing. A discussion of this, however, is beyond the scope of this Note.
7. A. Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal Pro-
cedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149 (1960).
8. No one can be held for criminal trial in a federal court for an "infamous" crime unless
he either has been indicted by a grand jury or has waived indictment.
The fifth amendment provides that "no person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury... ." An
infamous crime is one that may be punished by hard labor or imprisonment in a penitentiary.
Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417 (1885) ; United States v. Moreland, 258 U.S. 433 (1922).
Anyone sentenced to a term of imprisonment of more than one year may be confined in a
penitentiary. 18 U.S.C. § 4083 (1958).
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure recognize that the initiation of prosecutions by
presentment is obsolete. Note of Advisory Committee to Rule 7(a), 6 N.Y.U. ScHooL oF
LAw INsTrrUTE PROCEENmGS 15 (1946).
Prosecutors are permitted to proceed by information when a defendent waives in open
court his right to have a prosecution initiated through indictment. F,. R. Cnnx. P. 7(b).
In 1961, 19,145 federal criminal proceedings were commenced through indictment, and in
9,167 cases, indictment was waived. During the previous year, 18,677 prosecutions stemmed
from indictment, while 9,335 cases started with an information after a waiver of indictment.
1961 ANN. REP. Dm OF THE U. S. Couars 272.
Grand jury indictments are not required by the federal Constitution for state prosecu-
tions. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 538 (1884). State use of grand juries varies
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Ideally, the grand jury should look to guilt and innocence for its guide in
determining whom to indict, but since no distinction between guilt and in-
nocence is made until trial, the grand jury cannot directly apply these concepts
as a meaningful guide. It can, however, use these concepts indirectly by con-
sidering the possibility of an individual's conviction on the basis of a given
body of evidence. While the presumption of innocence prohibits the ascription
of "guilt" except upon conviction, its broadening of "innocence" to include all
states of nonconviction suggests the need for a prospective view of a subject's
innocence-prognostic innocence. A man is prognostically innocent when the
body of evidence relating to him cannot lead to conviction at trial. In screening
out unfounded accusations, the grand jury should not indict anyone prognos-
tically innocent in relation to the evidence it has heard; the foundation for the
accusation of such a person cannot lead to a destruction of his state of in-
nocence, and therefore the sanctions induced cannot be justified as part of a
process leading to conviction. The test derived from this is susceptibility to
conviction: has sufficient evidence been presented at the ex parte grand jury
hearing so that, if nothing more were heard at trial, a petit jury could conclude
that the prosecution had successfully borne the burden of proof ?9 The answer
to this question is not absolute as to guilt, but is predictive of how a petit jury
could react in the absence of an explanation by the defendant.
Functioning within the framework of its predictive purpose, the grand jury
tests the prosecutor's case for conviction. The grand jury's performance of its
adjudicatory role may, however, be distorted as a result of the prosecutor's
close relationship with the panel. The judge, although available to answer
legal questions, rarely has further contact with the grand jury after giving a
general charge.10 The prosecuting attorney draws up charges, outlines the
widely. Compare, e.g., N.Y. CoNsr. art. 1, § 6 with CAL. PENAL CODE § 737 (1954). Tile
analysis in this Note applies equally well to the grand juries in those states where indict.
ments are the usual means of proceeding against an individual.
9. Compare this test with those of Chief Justice Taney in Charge to Grand Jury, 30
Fed. Cas. 998, 999 (No. 18,257) (C.C.D. Md. 1836) ("You will, therefore,... present no
one, unless, in your deliberate judgment, the evidence before you is sufficient, in the absence
of any other proof, to justify the conviction of the party accused.") ; Justice Field in Charge
to Grand Jury, 30 Fed. Cas. 992, 994 (No. 18,255) (C.C.D. Cal. 1872) ("To justify the
finding of an indictment you must be convinced, so far as the evidence before you goes, that
the accused is guilty-in other words, you ought not to find an indictment unless, in your
judgment, the evidence before you, unexplained and uncontradicted, would warrant a con.
viction by a petit jury.") ; and Judge Kaufman in The Grand Jur--Its Role and Its Power,
17 F.R.D. 331, 335 (1955) ("Your prime function is to decide whether or not sufficient
evidence has been produced to indicate that a crime probably has been committed by the per-
son accused. Or, stated another way: if upon the credible evidence which you have heard,
absent an explanation by the defendant, you would be willing to convict, you should indict.").
But see Note, 62 HARV. L. Rxv. 111 n.5 and accompanying text (1948) : "The purpose of the
grand jury investigation is to protect the accused against unfounded or malicious prosecu-
tions by insuring that no criminal proceedings will be undertaken without a prior, disin-
terested determination of probable guilt.'
10. See Kaufman, The Grand Jury-Its Role and Its Power, 17 F.R.D. 331, 336
(1955) ; Dession, From Indictment to Information--Implcations of the Shift, 42 YALE L.J.
163, 177 (1932).
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government's case, calls and examines witnesses, presents evidence, sets forth
the law, and requests findings." Through the discharge of these responsibilities,
the prosecutor acquires a position of superintendence over grand jury proceed-
ings. The grand jury's dependence on the prosecutor is heightened by its lack
of independent sources of evidence-' The secrecy of the hearings and the
absence of everyone except grand jury members, stenographers, prosecutorial
personnel, interpreters when required, and the -witness under examination 13
strengthen the prosecutor's position by substantially precluding external
checks on his conduct. In addition to the formal relationship, a prosecutor and
grand jury may work together for a long period of time, creating a rapport
and sense of common purpose which can vest additional power in the prosecu-
tor.'4 With the power to influence the grand jury, the prosecutor bears special
responsibilities to conduct his case before it fairly. He must recognize the
tension created by his dual role of adversary and administrative officer; while
using evidence for its full probative value he should not distort or color it to
prejudice the position of the accused. The effective functioning of the grand
jury as a pretrial screen designed to minimize sanctions upon persons who are
not susceptible to conviction is endangered by the possibility that the prosecu-
tor will assume a total adversary role prematurely.'0
The prosecutor may not use certain kinds of evidence at trial. Since this
incompetent evidence cannot be used to convict and is therefore not relevant to
a determination about susceptibility to conviction, admissibility before a grand
jury acting within its predictive purpose should likewise be limited to com-
petent evidence. If incompetent evidence is admitted, a grand jury, assessing
the probative value of the evidence it hears, will not dismiss the incompetent
material from consideration and may not even discount it, for competency
bears no necessary relationship to credibility.1 0 In the absence of a restraint on
11. Orfield, The Federal Grand JTurv, 22 F.R.D. 343, 382-84, 425 (1959), and the cases
cited therein; Lewin, The Conduct of Grand Jury Proceedings in Antitrust Cases, 7 LAw
& Coxmn. PRoB. 112, 126-29 (1940).
12. Dession & Cohen, The Inquisitorial Functions of Grand Juries, 41 YAr.x LJ. 687,
696-99 (1932).
13. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(d).
14. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(g) provides that grand juries may serve for
as long as eighteen months. Justice Bernard Botein of the Appellate Division of the New
York Supreme Court, a former prosecutor, suggests the existence of just such an intimate
relationship between prosecutor and grand jury. See BorTai, THz PnosEcurort ch. 14
(1956).
15. See id. generally.
16. While some forms of incompetent evidence, such as hearsay testimony, are generally
excluded because their reliability as proof of an event is questionable, MfcCoRmicK, EvI-
DExcE § 224, at 457-59 (1954), other varieties are held inadmissible in order to further
public policies not directly related to the trial. For example, the exclusion of illegally seized
evidence is considered a means to prevent undesirable police tactics. AWees v. United States,
232 U.S. 383 (1914). Likewise, the rules which establish privileged relationships evince a
choice of encouraging openness in the specified relationships over providing completeness in
the testimony at trial. McCoRMcK, EvmENcE § 72, at 152 (1954). See generally, 8 WVxo.a,
EvxENmcs §§ 2175- 2396 (McNaughton ed. 1961).
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the use of incompetent evidence, the predictive judgment of the grand jury can
be distorted. Presently, there are no effective checks to prevent the prosecutor
from presenting to the grand jury any evidence he wants to introduce., Thus
the prosecutor can obtain indictments in cases where he would be unable to
satisfy the burden of proof. Whether the prosecutor's action is intentional, thus
qualifying as harassment-the imposition under color of law of sanctions prior
to conviction as a means of ultimate punishment 18-or is unintentional, sanc-
tions inflicted upon persons other than those susceptible to conviction are not
consistent with giving full weight to the demands of the presumption of in-
nocence.1
9
Where the basis of evidentiary incompetence is a violation of the search and
seizure provision of the fourth amendment, such evidence is presently sup-
pressible at any time before trial under Rule 41 (e) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure.20 No parallel remedy for other forms of incompetency
is prescribed. But if susceptibility to conviction is to be a meaningful criterion
for grand jury determinations, an extension of the remedy afforded by Rule
41(e) is necessary. The courts of appeals of two circuits, out of five which
have considered the problem, have stated that the Rule 41 (e) remedy extends
to evidence obtained in violation of the fifth amendment's self-incrimination
provision,21 and one Circuit judge has suggested in a concurrence that all
17. Statements urging that only competent evidence be presented to the grand jury have
not attained the stature of a legal rule in federal courts because the policy thus forwarded
has not been enforced. See e.g., United States v. Reed, 27 Fed. Cas. 727, 735 (No. 16,134)
(C.C.N.D. N.Y. 1852) ("Evidence before a grand jury must be competent legal evidence,
such as is legitimate and proper before a petit jury.") ; THoMPsON & MERrAM, CoNDuc'r
OF JURiEs 692 (1882) ("Although the hearing of testimony is largely removed from tile
superintendence of the court, the prosecuting officer should never attempt to introduce
testimony, which, upon a jury trial, would be regarded as incompetent.").
18. See J. Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process: Low
Visibility Decisions in the Administration of Justice, 69 YALE L.J. 543, 580-86 (1960). At
least some prosecutors are neither unaware of the uses of harassment nor unwilling to em-
ploy it. Id. at 583-84.
19. See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
20. A person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure may move the district court
for the district in which the property was seized for the return of the property and
to suppress for the use as evidence anything so obtained on the ground that (1) the
property was illegally seized without warrant, or (2) the warrant is insufficient on
its face, or (3) the property seized is not that described in the warrant, or (4) there
was not probable cause for believing the existence of the grounds on which the war-
rant was issued, or (5) the warrant was illegally executed. The judge shall receive
evidence on any issue of fact necessary to the decision of the motion. If the motion is
granted the property shall be restored unless otherwise subject to lawful detention and
it shall not be admissible in evidence at any hearing or trial. The motion to suppress
evidence may also be made in the district where the trial is to be had. The motion shall
be made before trial or hearing unless opportunity therefor did not exist or tile de-
fendant was not aware of the grounds for the motion, but the court in its discretion
may entertain the motion at the trial or hearing.
FED. R. CGlm. P. 41(e).
21. Holding for suppression are the Fourth and Second Circuits in Austin v. United
States, 297 F.2d 356 (4th Cir. 1961) and In re Fried, 161 F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1947), respec-
[Val. 7250
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illegally obtained evidence should be suppressed. The foundation upon which
Rule 41 (e) is based-the power of courts to develop and enforce rules of evi-
dence and to supervise the conduct of attorneys who appear before them-
appears to support pretrial suppression of all types of incompetent evidence.P
The societal aim of discouraging police employment of offensive tactics by pro-
hibiting the utilization of the products of such practices is generally ap-
plicable.24 The distinction which isolates for special treatment fourth amend-
ment violations has no basis in reason;25 instead, it seems rooted in the
fortuities of historical growth.1 0 At the time Rule 41 (e) was drafted, pretrial
suppression had been effected only in cases of fourth amendment violations.
Although Rule 41 (e) is merely a restatement of the law existing when it was
drafted 2 7 and carries no implication that the applicability of its remedy is
restricted, courts have been hesitant to extend this pretrial remedy.2 8
tively. The principal cases opposing this view are Biggs v. United States, 246 F.2d 40 (6th
Cir. 1957) ; Centracchio v. Garrity, 198 F2d 382 (lst Cir. 1952) ; and Eastus v. Bradshaw,
94 F.2d 788 (Sth Cir. 1938).
22. See the opinion of Judge Jerome Frank in In re Fried, 161 F.2d 453, 469 (2d Cir.
1947).
23. Compare Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914), and Wise v. Henkel,
220 U.S. 556, 558 (1911), with Eastus v. Bradshaw, 94 F.2d 788, 789 (5th Cir. 1938).
24. To the extent that the grand jury provides a forum in which illegally obtained evi-
dence can be utilized, the exclusionary policy articulated in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S.
383 (1914), will be undermined.
25. The property right argument that Rule 41(e) provides for the return of private
property wrongfully taken by the government, used to justify the distinction, is invalid. In
re Fried, 161 F.2d 453, 458 (2d Cir. 1947). But see Eastus v. Bradshaw, 94 F.2d 788, 789
(5th Cir. 1938). The rule explicity provides for the suppression as evidence of nonreturn-
able, unlawfully seized contraband; furthermore, testimony about what was seen during an
illegal search has been held inadmissible. McGinnis v. United States, 227 F.2d 593 (1st Cir.
1955).
26. Pretrial suppression entered the law as a method of excluding the products of illegal
searches and seizures. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), distinguisluing Adams
v. New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904). Such evidence, unlike involuntary confessions, was not
incompetent because of its questionable probative value, which at that time xas the only
reason for which the source of evidence was relevant to its admissibility. Adams v. United
States, 192 U.S. 585, 594 (1904). The requirement that objections to evidence obtained in
illegal searches and seizures be made before trial was later eased, and the fruits of fourth
amendment violations, as well as other forms of illegally obtained evidence, were subject to
challenge at trial. See Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921). The potentialities of
pretrial suppression were consequently not fully exploited.
27. Note of Advisory Committee to FaD. R. Cam. P. 41(e), 6 N.Y.U. ScuooL oF LAw
INsMUtE PROCEEDIiGS 70 (1946).
28. Such orders do not infringe on grand jury freedom. To be protected is the grand
jury's freedom in determining how it will pursue and dispose of subjects of inquiry. As with
all parts of the criminal process, the latitude of the grand jury's permissible action is circum-
scribed by a framework of procedural regulations. For example, a grand jury cannot compel
someone to give self-incriminatory testimony. See Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
Once it is decided that incompetent evidence takes the grand jury outside its permissible
area of activity, it cannot be said that enjoining the prosecutor from presenting that evidence
infringes on the historic freedom of the grand jury.
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Attempts to limit the basis of grand jury decisions to evidence admissible at
trial are complicated by the fact that the issues and direction of the case have not
yet been fully developed. Because the precise nature of the charges is not defined
prior to indictment, questions about the admissibility of evidence at trial which
turn on the content of the accusation cannot be answered before the grand
jury acts ;29 questions concerning evidence whose admissibility depends on a
particular situation developing at trial are likewise unanswerable at this pre-
trial stage.30 Principles of economy dictate that suppression motions should be
granted only when the evidence could not be used at trial under any circum-
stances. Otherwise, the program for effecting exclusion could develop into
a burdensome series of motions testing the admissibility of evidence within
changing and specific pretrial contexts. Thus, exclusion of incompetent evi-
dence from grand jury proceedings should be limited to evidence that in rela-
tion to an individual is determinably excludable under all circumstances. tin-
der this "determinably excludable" test, coerced confessions, products of illegal
searches, seizures, and wiretaps, and evidence breaching a privileged rela-
tionship, could be suppressed; some hearsay evidence or evidence of question-
able relevance could not.
Most of the problems in implementing exclusionary rules are attributable
to our extreme reluctance to impose external controls upon grand jury pro-
ceedings. 31 It is thought that minimal interference with the grand jury hear-
ings benefits both the prosecutor's investigation of cases and the objectivity of
the grand jurors' indictment decisions. Checks on the proceedings sufficient to
provide a full opportunity for individuals to challenge evidence would entail
opening the hearings, thereby sacrificing the secrecy believed essential to grand
jury operations.82 If exclusion depends on an individual's knowledge that the
29. Relevance has been considered an essential element for the admissibility of evI-
dence since evidence not relevant could logically have no probative effect on the issues at
trial. THAYER, PRELimiNARY TRnAnisE ON EVI-NacE 264-66 (1898). A definition of the
accusation logically precedes any decision about whether a given piece of evidence is relevant
to a determination about the truthfulness of the charges against an individual. Since the
product of grand jury action is a statement of the charges that an accused individual will
have to answer at trial, determinations about the relevance of evidence must await indictment.
30. For example, hearsay evidence can be used to impeach the testimony of a witness
by demonstrating inconsistency among his statements. 3 WIGMoRE, EvID Nc § 1018, at 687
(3d ed. 1940). Since the statement at trial of the assertion to be impeached must precede the
invocation of this exception to the hearsay rule, there can be no pretrial determination about
whether such hearsay evidence will be admitted at trial.
31. See, e.g., Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956).
32. Secrecy encourages free expression from witnesses by confining knowledge of the
testimony and thereby reducing fear of reprisal; protects suspects from the extra-legal
sanctions that could attach to someone suspected of crime but not indicted if the grand jury's
suspicions were publicized; insulates the grand jury's investigative and adjudicative proc-
esses from outside pressures by keeping the public ignorant of the cases under consideration;
and minimizes the likelihood of successful perjury or subornation, which could be ac-
complished through later witnesses conforming their testimony to that given earlier, or
to escape to avoid arrest under an imminent indictment. See Orfield, The Federal Grand
Jury, 22 F.R.D. 343,403 (1959).
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prosecutor has incompetent evidence which can be used against him, only
limited success in effectuating the grand jury's predictive purpose can be ex-
pected. It may be feasible to introduce a pre-indictment check directly into
the proceedings in the form of a master who would attend the hearings with
the power to raise a claim of privilege on behalf of its owner 33 and to chal-
lenge other forms of incompetent evidence on the basis of an extension of Rule
41(e). This check will be effective chiefly where, because of the relationship
of the parties involved or the character of the evidence, the existence of the
incompetency is apparent on the face of the evidence. Whether the extent of
abuse warrants the expenditure of a master's time and effort is uncertain, al-
though there may be other benefits to be derived from his presence. For ex-
ample, it would minimize the informal influence which a prosecutor can exert
over the grand jurors.34
Without affecting secrecy, exclusion of incompetent evidence from grand
jury proceedings would further be effectuated if objection to the use of such
evidence could be raised by the defendant after the indictment has been re-
turned.35 A defendant, once notified of the accusation, might well become
cognizant of the use of incompetent evidence in the grand jury hearings. Upon
the defendant's motion, a judge would examine the grand jury minutes to dis-
cover whether the alleged introduction of incompetent evidence occurred. If
such evidence was used, a court would either quash the indictment, necessitat-
ing another grand jury hearing, or determine whether the competent evidence
heard by the grand jury was sufficient to support an indictment. While this
practice could considerably mitigate the problems of enforcing an exclusionary
policy, it might virtually invite challenges to all indictments. 30 In any case, the
Supreme Court's pronouncements on postindictment challenges indicate it is
unlikely that this method of implementation will be adopted. 7
Opposition to pretrial motions excluding incompetent evidence from grand
jury proceedings centers upon the administrative difficulties such motions
would entail.38 On examination, however, these difficulties may not be serious
enough to outweigh the value of insuring a valid predictive judgment. In many
33. 8 WIGmam, EVIDENcE § 2196, at 112 (IN£cNaughton ed. 1961) ; McCoiuncN, EvZ-
nExcE § 73, at 152 (1954).
34. See notes 11-18 supra and accompanying text.
35. See, e.g., People v. Glen, 173 N.Y. 395,400, 66 N.E. 112, 114 (1903).
36. See Statev. Chance, 29 N.M. 34,39,221 Pac. 183, 185 (1923).
37. If indictments were to be held open to challenge on the ground that there was in-
adequate or incompetent evidence before the grand jury, the resulting delay would
be great indeed. The result of such a rule would be that before trial on the merits
a defendent could always insist on a kind of preliminary trial to determine the com-
petency and adequacy of the evidence before the grand jury. This is not required by
the Fifth Amendment An indictment returned by a legally constituted and un-
biased grand jury, like an information drawn by the prosecutor, if valid on its face,
is enough to call for trial of the charge on the merits. The Fifth Amendment re-
quires nothing more.
Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363 (1956).
38. See Note, 60 HARV. L. REv. 1145, 1151-52 (1947).
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cases, allowance of suppression motions will lengthen the criminal process.
On the other hand, a pretrial determination against the competency of evi-
dence has an ameliorative effect on the trial stage by eliminating the disrup-
tive and distracting in camera hearing on admissibility and by reducing the
length of the trial; a pretrial ruling upholding competency has no effect on
the trial stage. Any pretrial determination concerning evidentiary competence
necessitates an extra hearing; but the Federal Rules recognize other instances
where extra hearings are justified,30 and the reasons for this hearing seem suf-
ficiently strong to warrant the fragmentization it will produce. TJnsuccessful
pretrial motions require additional effort from the judiciary, the prosecutor,
and witnesses. For the prosecutor and witnesses, this increment takes the form of
a duplication of their trial functions and therefore involves little more than an ex-
penditure of time.40 A hearing judge must become conversant with the facts bear-
ing on admissibility, and when a different judge presides at trial, the inconveni-
ence is somewhat greater. When the motion to suppress succeeds, the hearing has
resulted in little extra effort, and the net effect is simply a change in the timing of
the competency determination. Although frivolous claims may be raised, they can
be disposed of with ease. Where no indictment or arrest would have been
sought or effected on the basis of the challenged evidence, the loss of time
and effort would be more striking. An off-setting saving may result where the
incompetence of the evidence on which the prosecutor based his case is pointed
out, prompting the abandonment of the action before it reaches advanced
stages in the criminal process. Finally, the principal objection against pre-
trial suppression motions-the opportunity for dilatory appeals-has been
emasculated by a recent Supreme Court holding that rulings on such motions
are interlocutory and hence not immediately appealable.
41
Recognizing that the grand jury's "adjudicating" and "investigating" func-
tions merely denote poles on a continuum and that they are often operative
simultaneously, it is still appropriate to prescribe separate rules acknowledg-
ing the differences so that the investigating power will not be materially af-
fected by a rule designed to improve the performance of the adjudicating func-
tion. When the grand jury is operating primarily as a investigative body, it
may hear any evidence. If it hears evidence which has been suppressed, it may
not proceed against the individual who secured the suppression or on whose
behalf it was secured, but rather the case of any individual so immunized
39. Among the motions that can be made during the pretrial period and necessitate
extra hearings are the 7(d) motion to strike surplusage from an indictment or information;
the 7(f) motion for a bill of particulars; the 12(b) (1) motion to raise before trial aty
defense that can be disposed of without a trial of the general issue; the 12(b) (2) motion
based on defects in the institution of the prosecution; and the 21(a) motion to transfer the
proceedings because of prejudice in the district. FED. R. ClRm. P. 7(d), 7(f), 12(b) (1),
12(b) (2), 21 (a).
40. The witnesses may not even be required to attend the hearing since pretrial sup-
pression motions are usually decided on affidavits. DiBella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121,
129 n.9 (1962).
41. Id. at 131.
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should be referred to another grand jury for adjudication. A grand jury per-
forming its adjudicative function may hear all evidence competent against any
suspect. If it hears evidence that has been suppressed, it may not indict the
individual who obtained the suppression order. His case is referred to a dif-
ferent adjudicative grand jury which will not hear the suppressed evidence.
Since evidence incompetent against one person may be admissible against an-
other, a prosecutor in a case involving multiple defendants must choose be-
tween using suppressed evidence, thereby immunizing the suppressor from
an indictment by that grand jury, and sacrificing the evidence in order to con-
tinue the proceedings against all. This problem is particularly acute in big
cases, such as antitrust prosecutions or cases arising from broad investigations,
where a grand jury may accumulate evidence for months.
The direct effect of a pretrial suppression remedy is necessarily limited. In
the first place, not all forms of incompetency can be challenged, and secondly,
the basis of incompetency may be such that neither the interested parties nor
a master at the hearing would be cognizant of those facts which would induce
a challenge. To the extent that challenges are made, however, decisions about
what evidence should be used before grand juries become visible 42 and hence
reviewable. By giving some substance to a rule limiting the grand jury to
competent evidence, preindictment suppression should exert an important
exhortative force on prosecutors, thus discouraging the use of incompetent
evidence. Because it is believed that some effective provision for enforcement
must be included if policy is to be implemented, this scheme for pre-indictment
suppression seems preferable to a simple statutory declaration, which some
states have,43 that only competent evidence should be used at grand jury
hearings.44
42. For a discussion of visibility in a different context, see generally J. Goldstein,
Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process: Low Visibility Decisions its the Ad-
ministration of Justice, 69 YAtE L.J. 543 (1960).
43. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-5-22 (1953), and State v. Chance, 29 N.M. 34, 39,
221 Pac. 183, 184-85 (1923).
44. It may be argued that the extension of procedural safeguards to grand jury hearings
will pervert the grand jury's role by leading the petit jury to attach undue respect to the
findings of the earlier panel. Nothing indicates, however, that this innovation in grand jury
operations would elicit substantially greater respect from the petit jury. Since it is unlikely
that the petit jury now assumes that the grand jury hears incompetent evidence, the change
should have little effect on the relationship. At any rate, the greater danger lies in a belief
that grhnd jury accusations might represent a more accurate appraisal of absolute as op-
posed to systemic guilt, a belief that could follow from the inapplicability at the grand jury
stage of what might seem to the layman to be "technical" rules of evidence which operate to
hide "truth." To the extent that the uniform application of rules of competency at all stages
in the criminal process destroys such a belief, the danger that the petit jury will believe in the
"veracity" of grand jury findings is minimized, and community confidence restored to its
rightful place, the final determination by the petit jury.
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